We describe an ongoing project, the deployment of a modular checker to statically find and prevent every buffer overflow in future versions of a Microsoft product. Lightweight annotations specify requirements for safely using each buffer, and functions are checked individually to ensure they obey these requirements and do not overflow. Our focus is on the incremental deployment of this technology: by layering the annotation language, using aggressive inference techniques, and slicing warnings by checker confidence, teams must pay only part of the cost of annotating a program to achieve part of the benefit, which provides incentive for further annotation. To date over 400,000 annotations have been added to specify buffer usage in the source code for this product, of which over 150,000 were automatically inferred, and over 3,000 potential buffer overflows have been found and fixed.
INTRODUCTION
We describe an ongoing project, the deployment of a modular checker to statically find and prevent every buffer overflow in future versions of a Microsoft product. Lightweight annotations specify requirements for safely using each buffer, and functions are checked individually to ensure they obey these requirements and do not overflow. To date over 400,000 annotations have been added to specify buffer usage in the source code for this product, of which over 150,000 were automatically inferred, and over 3,000 potential buffer overflows have been found and fixed.
Our checker is an integral part of the development process for this product. Developers receive immediate feedback about potential overflows in their code as part of the build process, and identified issues must be fixed before code can be added to mainline branches. Our checker is only one of many tools used to identify security issues. In combination with testing and runtime mitigation, these provide a robust defense against security exploits.
The key lesson from our experience has been the need to focus on incremental deployment of annotation-based checking. An all-or-nothing approach to deployment is incredibly risky, requiring huge initial effort for potentially minimum payoff. Incremental deployment allows teams to pay part of the cost of annotating to realize part of the benefit, which provides incentive for further annotation. Our system has been engineered from the ground up to provide incremental benefit for incremental cost. The principal components of our system are:
• SAL, an annotation language (Section 3). A language sufficiently general to specify any buffer interface will be needlessly complicated for simple interfaces. We layer the annotation language to reduce the startup effort needed to learn the language and understand each annotation. A base set of primitive annotations allow for general but verbose interface specifications. These primitives compose into high-level annotations, which compactly describe the most common interfaces. To annotate the vast majority of a code base, developers need only the high-level annotations, and learn to use the primitives only as necessary.
• SALInfer, an annotation inference engine (Section 4). Inference can dramatically reduce the effort needed to annotate legacy code. We opt for an aggressive and unsound inference, which can infer many correct annotations at the expense of inferring some false ones. Inference algorithms are fully customizable Datalog programs, allowing extensive code base specific tuning to maximize accuracy and coverage.
• ESPX, a modular overflow checker (Section 5). The checker must find overflows accurately in any annotated, partially annotated, or unannotated code base. This is accomplished by slicing results by confidence, presenting only the warnings most likely to correspond to overflows. While false negatives, or missed overflows, are possible (our tool is used alongside additional checkers and runtime mitigation techniques, providing additional defense against missed overflows), as annotations are added, the level of confidence in warnings increases, and the number of false negatives decrease. Fully annotated code is comprehensively checked for overflows. if (len > 100) 8: Alloc(&tmp, len * sizeof(wchar_t)); 9: 10:
StringCopy(tmp, str, len); 11:
... 12: } 13: 14: void StringCopy(wchar_t *dst, wchar_t *src, int size) 15: { 16: wchar_t *dtmp = dst, *stmp = src; 17: 18: for (int i = 0; i < size -1 && *stmp; i++) 19:
*dtmp++ = *stmp++; 20:
*dtmp = 0; 21: } 22: 23: void Alloc(void **buf, int size) 24: { 25:
*buf = malloc(size); 26: }
Figure 1: Example application
In Section 2 we begin with a brief example of the benefits and problems with modular checking. In Sections 3, 4, and 5 we describe the previous components in detail. In Section 6 we evaluate how well our system works in practice, and in Section 7 we discuss related work.
EXAMPLE
Consider how the program in Figure 1 is manually reviewed to be certain it is free from buffer overflows. Function StringCopy has an implicit interface for its parameter dst, requiring it to have a capacity of at least size elements. When reviewing ProcessString, we make sure that, when passed to StringCopy on line 10, tmp is at least len elements long. As long as StringCopy obeys its interface and writes at most len elements to tmp, ProcessString will not overflow.
StringCopy performs a character-by-character copy of src into dst, ensuring that the result is zero terminated. When reviewing StringCopy, we make sure that at most size elements are written to dst. As long as the interface is obeyed by its callers, StringCopy will not overflow. Now, suppose the allocation size on line 8 is changed to simply len. Then ProcessString may call StringCopy with a buffer only len / sizeof(wchar t) elements long, and since ProcessString does not obey the interface on StringCopy, StringCopy may overflow. Alternatively, suppose the condition on line 18 is changed to simply *stmp. Then StringCopy may write more than len elements to dst, and since StringCopy does not obey its own interface, ProcessString may overflow.
Even very thorough manual review will miss many overflows such as these, and static checking is necessary for comprehensive safety guarantees. Effectively performing this checking requires knowledge of the implicit interface between ProcessString and StringCopy, and an understanding of how each function obeys that interface. A checker local to each modified function will not learn the interface, while a checker global to the entire code base will not understand the functions well enough without sacrificing scalability. Figure 3 ). The modified code is locally checked against these interfaces, and if it passes we guarantee it introduces no new overflows. A modular checker can precisely and comprehensively check code bases for overflows. The drawback is the need for annotations. Code will only be annotated if there is demonstrable benefit to doing so. As such, we provide checking benefit for unannotated and partially annotated code bases, and ease the annotation process through effective inference and a clean, usable annotation language.
ANNOTATION LANGUAGE
We use annotations to describe requirements on buffer pointers (in C, all pointers reference buffers and may overflow; all pointers must then be annotated). For each buffer pointer passed into or returned by each function, what is the function's interface with the buffer, i.e. what are the assumptions and guarantees the function makes about the buffer's length and contents?
Design of the annotation language has two chief goals, expressiveness and conciseness.
• Expressive annotations accurately describe a wide variety of buffer interfaces. If a buffer interface cannot be accurately annotated, checking the correctness of that function and its callers requires the interface to be changed. This is often impossible or impractical due to the need for backward compatibility, and even if possible, presents a huge cost to developers.
• Concise annotations succinctly describe buffer interfaces. Verbose annotations have several costs: individual annotations will be difficult to understand and difficult to write, and, most importantly, easy to get wrong. Investment in annotating a code base is largely wasted if the annotations are frequently incorrect and inconsistent.
Expressiveness and conciseness are, unfortunately, often at odds with each other. We achieve a combination of expressiveness and conciseness by layering the annotation language. An expressive layer of primitive annotations describe primitive properties held by particular buffers at function entry or exit. Several primitive annotations are necessary to completely describe most interfaces. A second, concise layer of buffer annotations describe all common interfaces. Only one buffer annotation is required for each interface, simplifying and reducing errors in the annotation process. In practice, buffer annotations are used to describe all applicable interfaces. For more complicated cases, primitive annotations are effective.
Primitive Annotations
Each primitive annotation describes a particular property that must be held by particular buffer pointers at either entry to or exit from the function. These properties form a natural extension of the pointer's type, and thus we represent primitive annotations as qualifiers on the types of pointer parameters and return values. Types are an extremely succinct way of specifying interfaces, and one with which developers are already familiar. We present the full grammar for primitive annotations here. Example annotations are shown in Figure 2 , and discussed in Example 1.
The primitive properties we are interested in are NULLness and the readable and writable extents of each pointer. Memory is initially writable, and made readable by initializing it. Readable and writable extents are permissions: they may not describe the entire buffer (for example, only part of a buffer may be marked as writable), and they may not describe all permissions which are held (for example, a function may only have read permission for a buffer, even if its caller also has write permission).
The possible primitive annotations are given by Table 1 . Each column in the table identifies one aspect of a primitive annotation, and any primitive annotation may be formed by choosing one value from each column ( indicates an empty value) and combining them together using ' ' as a separator. For example, choosing pre and eread(e l ) yields ' pre eread(e l )'. The meaning of each column and value is as follows:
• Where: Which point the property holds at.
-pre: At function entry.
-post: At function exit.
• Level: Which pointer v the property holds for, relative to the annotated parameter/returned pointer p.
-: The property holds for p.
The property holds for all pointers at * p.
• Property: Which property holds for the pointer v. As each primitive annotation is a well-defined precondition or postcondition on the function, any combination of primitive annotations on a pointer leads to a checkable interface. Example 1. Consider again the application in Figure 1 . Figure 2 shows the primitive annotations for each pointer used by each function.
ProcessString takes a string str, copies it into a scratch buffer and does not write to it. The string must be non-NULL and readable (but not writable) up to a zero terminator. The correct annotations are pre notnull and pre zread.
StringCopy takes a string src and copies as much of it into dst as possible, not exceeding size characters and zero terminating dst. src is annotated as pre notnull and pre zread as before. dst must be a non-NULL buffer with size elements, writable but not readable at entry, and must be initialized with a zero terminated string at exit. The correct annotations are pre notnull, pre ewrite(size), and post zread.
Alloc returns an uninitialized buffer with size bytes by assigning to *buf. Both buf and *buf must be annotated. buf must be non-NULL and will filled in with a single value. The correct annotations are pre notnull, pre ewrite(1), and post eread(1). *buf will be filled in with a non-NULL buffer with size uninitialized bytes. The correct annotations are post deref notnull and post deref bwrite(size). 2
The chief drawback of using primitive annotations is the large number that may be required for simple interfaces. In Figure 2 , for example, three annotations are required simply to specify that parameter buf of Alloc is filled in with one value. An effective annotation system must describe such simple interfaces clearly and concisely. To accomplish this, we use buffer annotations.
Buffer Annotations
Each buffer annotation fully describes a buffer interface, and includes all properties needed to safely use a buffer pointer. As with primitive annotations, buffer annotations are represented as type qualifiers. We present the full grammar for buffer annotations here. Example annotations are shown in Figure 3 , and discussed in Example 2.
The main concept which allows for concise interface description is usage. Buffer pointer parameters are naturally either in, out, or inout, according to whether they move data into or out of the function, and this abstraction is somewhat clumsy to encode with preconditions and postconditions.
The possible buffer annotations are given by Table 2 , and, as with primitive annotations, individual buffer annotations are formed by choosing one value from each column and combining them. The meaning of each column and value is as follows:
• Usage: How the buffer is used by the function.
-in: Passed in and read from.
-out: Passed in and written to.
-inout: Passed in and read/written to.
-ret: Returned via return value.
-dret: Returned via an out parameter.
• Optional: Whether the buffer pointer may be NULL.
-: Must be non-NULL.
-opt: May be NULL.
• Initialized: How much of the buffer is initialized. This is a lower bound on the initialized amount (more could be initialized, but not less). The initialized length may change during execution for out and inout buffers. For out parameters, only the initialized length at exit is described. For inout parameters, the initialized length at both entry and exit is described.
-: One element.
-ecount(e l ): e l elements.
-bcount(e l ): e l bytes.
-zterm: Up to the first zero terminator.
• Capacity: The total allocated capacity of the buffer. This is a lower bound on the capacity.
-: The initialized amount (at function entry for inout buffers). -ecap(es): es elements. -bcap(es): es bytes.
A total of 120 buffer annotations may be formed from Table 2 , which collectively describe the simplest and most common buffer interfaces in use.
Example 2. Consider again the application in Figure 1 . For each pointer parameter and return value in this application, we must pick appropriate values from each column of Table 2 , combining them to form the correct annotation.
ProcessString takes a string str, copies it into a scratch buffer and does not write to it. The string is then in, and since it must be zero terminated, is also zterm. The correct annotation is in zterm.
StringCopy takes a string src and copies as much of it into dst as possible, not exceeding size characters and zero terminating dst. src is in zterm as before. dst is out, zterm when initialized at exit, and ecap(size) since up to size characters may be written. The correct annotation is out zterm ecap(size).
Alloc returns an uninitialized buffer with size bytes by assigning to *buf. buf is simply out. *buf is returned through buf, and thus dret, has bcount(0) bytes initialized but bcap(size) bytes allocated, so the correct annotation is dret bcount bcap(0,size).
2
Each buffer annotations is defined as a set of primitive annotations (in our implementation, each buffer annotation is a C macro expanding to the corresponding primitives). For example, out is equivalent to pre notnull, pre ewrite(1), and post eread (1) . This provides a clear definition of each buffer annotation and narrows the set of annotations the checker must understand to simple preconditions and postconditions.
A few buffer annotations cannot be represented with primitive annotations, and cannot be checked for correctness. In particular, out zterm annotates a buffer for which the function is given carte blanche to write a string of any size. We disallow these unsafe buffer annotations; calls to functions which require them (well-known examples include the C standard library functions strcpy, strcat, gets, and sprintf) are being removed through a separate process not described here, and are ignored by our checker. Many overflows occur due to functions with unsafe interfaces; for example, 5 of the 14 overflows studied in [18] are due to incorrect usage of strcpy and sprintf.
ANNOTATION INFERENCE
Comprehensively checking legacy code for overflows requires that code to be annotated. For large code bases, the cost of legacy annotation can be very high. Annotation inference offers a way to avoid much of this cost. Rather than requiring manual annotation of significant portions of the code base before it can be checked, we annotate as much as possible automatically, and check the code for overflows and incorrect annotations.
The chief requirement for an inference tool is scalability. Legacy code bases may contain tens of millions lines of code, and inference tools are useless for code bases they cannot generate results for. Beyond scalability, inference effectiveness is measured by its accuracy and coverage.
• Accuracy is the fraction of inferred annotations that are correct. Incorrect annotations are caught by the checker, but the error messages can be confusing and the developer cost of fixing an incorrect annotation is often higher than that of adding the correct annotation initially.
• Coverage is the fraction of correct annotations that are inferred. Incomplete annotations have minimal impact on checker effectiveness, and require significantly more developer effort to fully annotate the code base.
Under the fixed requirement for scalability, accuracy and coverage are at odds with each other. More accurate techniques infer less information, compromising coverage, and higher coverage techniques infer more information, compromising accuracy. Both can be improved through more precise analysis, but scalability is then impacted. To optimize these trade/offs, we use a fully customizable inference engine, which can be rapidly tuned to generate effective results for particular code bases and kinds of annotations.
To infer buffer annotations, we infer each aspect (usage, NULL-ness, initialized length and capacity) independently, aggressively and unsoundly propagating states, particular properties holding of particular values at particular program points, through the code base. Propagation rules are fully customizable, controlled by identifying source code patterns using rules which are themselves fully customizable. Constraining or removing rules decreases the amount of inferred information, increasing accuracy, while expanding or adding rules increases the amount of inferred information, increasing coverage.
Example 3. Consider again the application in Figure 1 . Parameter dst for StringCopy needs the buffer annotation out zterm ecap(size). This encapsulates four pieces of information: dst is only written to, must be non-NULL, will be zero terminated, and must be at least size elements long. Figure 4 shows how each of these properties may be separately inferred and combined into the correct annotation.
Each out state indicates a value that may be written to later in the function. StringCopy writes to dtmp on line 19 (and 20), so out(dtmp) is added beforehand at program point p3. We propagate this backwards through the assignment on line 16 from dst to dtmp, adding out(dst) at the entry point p2 of StringCopy. From this, we infer that dst is an out parameter. (If dst was also read from, we would also infer in(dst) at p2 to yield inout).
Each req state indicates a value that is required to be non-NULL; it may be accessed later in the function without being checked against NULL first. dtmp is accessed on line 19, so req(dtmp) is added at p3. Since there is no prior guard against NULL, we propagate back to p2 and infer that StringCopy requires dst to be non-NULL.
Each zterm state indicates a value that may be zero terminated later in the function. StringCopy writes a zero to dtmp on line 20. As dtmp is also a string type, we add zterm(dtmp) at p4, propagate this back to p2 and infer that StringCopy should zero terminate dst.
Each cap state indicates buffer-size pairs of values, with a size kind of either 'e' (elements) or 'b' (bytes). On line 25, Alloc copies into buf a malloc'ed buffer with size bytes. cap(*buf,size,'b') is added at p5, and propagated through the call on line 8 to cap(tmp,len,'e') at p1, changed to an element count by the multiplication len * sizeof(wchar t). We propagate through the call on line 10 to cap(dst,size,'e') at p2, and infer that StringCopy expects dst to be size elements long.
2 Note in Example 3 that the propagation method for buffersize relationships is unsound; at the call on line 10 it is known that tmp and len are a buffer-size pair, but there is no guarantee at entry to StringCopy that this always holds. Observing the lengths of buffers actually passed to a function is a simple and reliable method for guessing the required length, and such leaps of logic are crucial for effective inference. However, this process may break down on certain code base specific patterns. For example, some APIs take either Unicode or ASCII strings, depending on the value of some flag, and the resulting path-sensitive behavior must be recognized and avoided.
We accomplish this through customization, tuning the inference to behave effectively for the targeted code base. Each inference algorithm is simply a Datalog program, and the inference engine is a custom Datalog solver, built under the requirements of performing interprocedural analysis over millions of lines of code.
Each inference algorithm uses two input predicates prop and edge to specify, respectively, all raw syntax and control flow information for the targeted code base. The algorithm rules then iteratively build up high level semantic Example 4. An inference algorithm for buffer/size relationships is given in Figure 5 . Buffer information is seeded at malloc call sites and propagated forward and backward through assignments, using the feasible relationships at function entry points to infer capacity annotations.
Rules 1-7 identify syntax tree patterns for buffer propagation. Patterns are constructed using the prop predicate, which identifies the value of a named property of a syntax tree t. A fixed set of property names allow inference algorithms to extract all available information. For example, rule 1 identifies malloc call sites which return buffer b with size s. Property 'kind' picks out the base kind of the tree ('call'), while 'callee' identifies the callee, 'retval' identifies the return value, and 'arg0' identifies the first argument.
Rules 8-16 propagate cap states through the target code base. States are constructed using (optionally) other states, patterns and the edge predicate, which identifies forward control flow edges between program points p0 and p1, picking out the syntax tree t for the action taken over that edge. Rule 8 seeds cap by deriving states after every malloc site. Rules 9-12 propagate cap forward across copies of the buffer or size, and backward across assignments into the buffer or size, while rules 13-14 propagate forward and backward across assignments that scale the size between an element or byte count. Finally, rules 15-16 propagate cap across all edges that do not kill (assign into) either the buffer or size.
Rule 17 infers fcap output annotations, which pick out Predicates input prop(t,x,v) Property x of syntax tree t is value v. input edge(p0,p1,t) Program points p0 and p1 are connected by a control flow edge with syntax tree t. pattern malloc(t,b,s) t is a call to malloc returning buffer b with size s. pattern assign(t,l,r) t is an assignment from r to l. pattern scale (t,v) t is a multiplication of v by some value. pattern sassign(t,l,r) t is an assignment from a scaled r to l. pattern nokill (t,b,s) t is a syntax tree that does not erase the value of b or s. pattern entry(t,f ) t is the syntax tree for the entry edge of function f . 
Pattern Rules
1. malloc(t,b,s) :-prop(t,'kind','call'), prop(t,'callee','malloc'), prop(t,'retval',b), prop(t,'arg0',s).
2. assign(t,l,r) :-prop(t,'kind','assign'), prop(t,'lhs',l), prop(t,'rhs',r).
scale(t,v)
:-prop(t,'kind','times'), prop(t,'lhs',v).
:-prop(t,'kind','times'), prop(t,'rhs',v). 5. sassign(t,l,r) :-assign(t,l,t ), scale(t ,r).
nokill(t,b,s) :-∼assign(t,b, ), ∼assign(t,s, ).

entry(t,f )
:-prop(t,'kind','entry'), prop(t,'func',f ).
State Rules
cap(p,b,s,'b') :-edge( ,p,t), malloc(t,b,s).
9. cap(p1,l,s,k) :-cap(p0,r,s,k), edge(p0,p1,t), assign(t,l,r). 10. cap(p1,b,l,k) :-cap(p0,b,r,k), edge(p0,p1,t), assign(t,l,r). 11. cap(p0,r,s,k) :-cap(p1,l,s,k), edge(p0,p1,t), assign(t,l,r). 12. cap(p0,b,r,k) :-cap(p1,b,l,k), edge(p0,p1,t), assign(t,l,r).
13. cap(p1,b,l,'b') :-cap(p0,b,r,'e'), edge(p0,p1,t), sassign(t,l,r). 14. cap(p0,b,r,'e') :-cap(p1,b,l,'b'), edge(p0,p1,t), sassign(t,l,r). 
Output Rules
fcap(f ,b,s,k) :-cap(p,b,s,k), edge( ,p,t), entry(t,f ).
MODULAR CHECKER
Given the buffer interfaces in a code base, checking the safety of each function f with callees g is, in the end, fairly straightforward: assuming f 's preconditions and each g's postconditions hold, is each access safe and are f 's postconditions and each g's preconditions guaranteed to hold? The chief difficulty arrives when, due to incomplete information, we cannot be sure that the code is definitely safe, nor that it is definitely unsafe.
The checker's goal is to miss no overflows in passed code. For a property as pervasive and complex as memory usage, this goal is not immediately realizable on an existing code base. To yield useful results on unannotated or partially annotated code bases, the checker must be confident that reports are genuinely errors. We briefly describe the checker algorithm here. In Section 5.1 we describe how confidence tunes the checker to the degree of annotation.
For each function, the checker performs an exhaustive path exploration based on the RHS algorithm [12] . At each program point, we compute the feasible sets of linear constraints over constant values, locations l (variables and heap values), and pointer capacities (denoted as bcap(l)). If at a control flow join point multiple sets of linear constraints are feasible, they are not merged but are separately analyzed. This reduces information loss, simplifies constraint representation, and, most importantly, allows us to easily generate traces for developer inspection. To ensure termination, the set of constraints is widened (made more general) according to heuristics along loop back edges.
At function entry, constraints are generated and assumed from the preconditions. For example, if pre bwrite(len) holds for parameter buf, the constraint bcap(buf) ≥ len is generated. At each dereference on a pointer location l, we generate constraints describing whether the accessed portion is in bounds, and check whether they always hold. For example, if buf [2] is accessed and elements of buf are 2 bytes wide, the constraint bcap(buf) ≥ 6 is checked. If this constraint is not guaranteed to hold, an overflow is possible. At each function call, constraints are generated from the callee preconditions and checked, while further constraints are generated and assumed from the callee postconditions. Finally, at function exit constraints are generated from the postconditions and checked. Figure 6 shows the constraints generated for a modified version of function ProcessString: the allocation size on line 8 has been changed to len, introducing an overflow.
There are two paths through ProcessString, depending on whether buffer tmp is stack or heap allocated at the call to false branch of the if statement on line 7 adds the constraint len ≤ 100. At the call to StringCopy on line 10, we must ensure that pre ewrite(size) holds for parameter dst, and thus for the arguments that bcap(tmp) ≥ len * 2. This constraint is implied by bcap(tmp) = 200 and len ≤ 100, so StringCopy's precondition is satisfied and the call is safe.
On path 2, tmp is heap allocated, with half the required size. At the call to Alloc on line 8, we must ensure that pre ewrite(1) holds for parameter buf, and thus for the arguments that bcap(&tmp) ≥ 4, which must hold since tmp is a stack variable. We then assume post deref bwrite(size) for buf, adding the argument constraint bcap(tmp) ≥ len and removing bcap(tmp) = 200. At the call to StringCopy on line 10, we must again ensure that bcap(tmp) ≥ len * 2. If bcap(tmp) = len and len > 0 this does not hold, and since the precondition may not be satisfied, the call is not safe and a warning is issued. 2
Checker Confidence
To prove an access safe, the checker requires knowledge about the access external to the function and an understanding of the function's behavior with respect to the access. With complete knowledge and sufficient understanding by the checker, all accesses which cannot be proved safe are likely bugs and reported as such. Where the checker has an incomplete or imprecise model of the code, however, the checker reports only the accesses it is most confident of being unsafe. This opens a path to soundness: the value provided by identifying bugs gives incentive to improve knowledge and understanding, gradually eliminating false negatives.
External knowledge about accesses is conveyed through the buffer interfaces annotated for each function. Deficiencies here are categorized as follows:
• Unannotated interfaces. Absent any knowledge of the read and write extents for a pointer, no meaningful constraints can be generated and the checker can say nothing other than that it needs an annotation.
• Unannotatable interfaces. Some interfaces cannot be completely or correctly described by primitive annotations. Examples include unsafe string functions and functions which rely on particular conditions to hold or particular properties to hold only conditionally, as well as interfaces on structure field pointers or global pointers.
We are currently working to support conditional annotations and annotations on structure fields and global variables, greatly reducing the number of unannotatable interfaces. Beyond this, the key challenge is to actually get pointers annotated. Since proving an access safe often requires knowledge both of the function's interfaces and its callee's interfaces, we find that incremental annotation is best done in a targeted fashion. Particular classes of interfaces, such as those in new code, in particular parts of the code base, or on particular kinds of buffers (tainted buffers, string buffers, etc.), are in turn exhaustively annotated and checked.
Even if a particular buffer interface is annotated, the checker's confidence that accesses on it are unsafe is determined by how well the constraints on that access are understood by the checker. Sources of analysis imprecision are categorized as follows:
• Complex operations. Many program operations cannot be precisely represented as constraints. For example, after the statement x = y & z; we know only that x < y and x < z. Code can be proved safe even if it is not modelled precisely, but where the imprecision is relevant to safety the checker will have more false positives and degrades its confidence accordingly.
• Loop widening. Many loops can run for an unbounded number of iterations, and to ensure checker termination constraints are widened at loop back edges. If the loop invariants relevant to safety are retained during widening, the code can be proved safe, but if not then false positives increase and confidence degrades.
Accesses whose constraints cannot be modelled precisely have lower confidence of being unsafe, and yet may be bugs. To reason about checker imprecision, we recover dependency information from use/mod sets for complex operations and loop conditions. Checker warnings are then prioritized based on the amount and nature of the imprecision involved in constraining the access, allowing for either minimal false positives with high priority warnings, or minimal false negatives (excepting unannotated pointers) with all warnings. The different warning levels we use are as follows, in decreasing order of priority.
1. No information constraining the access is lost. If the path containing the access is feasible, the access is provably unsafe and may overflow.
2. Some information constraining the access is lost, but appears unrelated to the pointer's length. If all lost information about the access is unrelated to the length, and the remainder cannot be used to prove the access safe, the access is a likely overflow. 3. Some information relating the access with the pointer length is lost. The access cannot be proved safe, but little evidence exists that it is unsafe either.
Checker precision is improved in a targeted fashion according to the distribution of bugs and false positives. Particular patterns of bugs are identified and handled more precisely in the checker to boost their priority, whereas particular classes of false positives are identified and handled more precisely to prove them safe and increase the overall quality of the warnings at that level.
RESULTS
We sketch the current deployment status of the annotation language, inference, and checker over the Microsoft product. In Sections 6.1-6.3 we gauge the effectiveness of each in turn.
Annotations are added through two main mechanisms. First, new code must be fully annotated before being checked in. Using concise buffer annotations, this burden is comparable to that of adding types. Second, annotations are used as quality gates, such that by certain milestones all buffers matching certain criteria must be annotated. In total, over 400,000 annotations have been added to the product.
While the inference is run centrally to generate annotations, control over annotation insertion is given to individual developers. A tool fetches inferred annotations from a central location, and offers them for (optional) inspection before inserting them. Through informal surveys, we estimate that over 150,000 annotations were inserted using this tool.
The checker is deployed on the desktop machine of every developer working on the product, finding potential overflows in code within minutes of being written. All warnings are available to developers, and all level 1 warnings (Section 5.1) must be fixed before check-in. In total, over 3,000 have been fixed due to the checker.
Language Effectiveness
By using separate primitive and buffer annotation layers, we seek to annotate the great majority of buffer interfaces concisely, but still have the expressive power to annotate the many unusual interfaces that may be in use.
To gauge the annotations' effectiveness at concisely representing interfaces, we check the relationship between the frequency of an interface and the complexity of the annotation required to represent it. The most common interfaces should have the simplest representation. Table 3 relates interface frequency with the complexity of the corresponding buffer and primitive annotations for over 400,000 annotations. We measure the complexity of a set of annotations for an interface as the total number of values used from Table 1 or Table 2 .
Weighted by frequency, interfaces are annotated with buffer annotations using an average of 1.24 values, or with primitive annotations using an average of 4.35 values, a 251% increase. Additionally, as can be seen from the annotation lengths in Table 3 , the least complex buffer annotations describe the most common interfaces, while there is little correlation between primitive annotation complexity and interface frequency.
Inference Effectiveness
Running inference specifications over the entire product's code bases yields ∼1,800,000 in, out, and req annotations, and ∼120,000 ecap and bcap annotations. We use sampling to gauge the accuracy and coverage of these annotations, and thus their overall quality and effectiveness. Accuracy is estimated as the fraction of a random sample of inferred annotations which are correct, and coverage is estimated as the fraction of a random sample of code base function parameters for which the correct annotations were inferred. code bases which may call into each other, as parameter information is not propagated across such calls. The few false positives are due to aliasing; for example, if one alias for a value is checked against NULL before another alias is dereferenced, a req annotation will still be inferred. For ecap and bcap, we estimate that we infer 49% of the correct annotations for a code base with a 28% false positive rate. Most false negatives are due to complex pointer and size arithmetic that is not handled by the specification, isolated functions to which sizes cannot be propagated, and, as with in, out and req, separately analyzing code bases that call into each another. Most false positives are due to confusion between byte and element counts on a buffer, or between multiple buffers and multiple sizes; for example, if two buffers are passed to a function with identical constant sizes, those buffer/size relationships will be tangled together. In practice, we exploit type and naming conventions to reduce the false positive rate to less than 10%.
Checker Effectiveness
We have tested the checker on the suite of buffer overflow model programs developed by Zitser et. al. [18] . These are based directly on vulnerable and patched versions of several open source server applications, and form the most realistic publically available testing suite of which we are aware. Of the 14 vulnerable programs, 5 may overflow due to the incorrect use of unsafe string functions (e.g. strcpy and sprintf). Uses of these functions are identified and removed through a separate checking process, and as such we do not annotate or analyze them (see Section 3.2). Of the remaining 9 programs, we supplied relevant annotations (all of which are on standard library functions or are automatically inferred) and ran our checker, which issued warnings for the relevant lines in 7 vulnerable programs (true positives) and 3 patched programs (false positives). Most warnings are level 2 and 3. The results of these runs are shown in Table 5 .
Of the two missed overflows, SM-6 is on a global buffer which we do not yet annotate (see Section 5.1), and BIND-2 is due to a signed-to-unsigned cast of a potentially negative size variable, a different type of bug which is caught by a separate integer overflow checker not described here. Figure 7 shows checker performance on numerous partially annotated code bases (all overflows resulting from these warnings have been fixed). Warning counts are moderately correlated with annotation density, with an R 2 measure of predictive power of 42%. Overflows are readily found on unannotated code, with coverage steadily increasing as annotations are incrementally added.
RELATED WORK
Many annotation-based checkers have been developed to detect buffer overflows and other security errors, including CSSV [5] , Eau Claire [2] , Splint [7] , and MECA [17] . The principal novelty with our system is our incremental approach to annotation. Existing systems either require fully annotated code bases to perform effective checking [5, 2] or cannot comprehensively check even fully annotated code bases [7, 17] .
CSSV [5] is a modular overflow checker for string-intensive C programs. CSSV's annotation language is considerably more expressive but considerably less concise than ours. Sound contracts are inferred by approximating the weakest preconditions and strongest postconditions on functions, but lack coverage compared to manual annotation. Functions are combined with contracts to produce an integer program which is checked for violations. This method is sound and precise, but requires the analyzed function and its callees to be fully annotated.
ESC/Java [9] uses a sophisticated theorem prover for general purpose modular checking. Eau Claire [2] uses ESC to find buffer overflows in C programs, extending the annotation language with constructs similar to that of CSSV. Since the checking method used by ESC does not widen loops, either invariants must be provided or a fixed number of iterations are simulated, a limited approach for analyzing loop-intensive buffer manipulations.
Splint [7] extends LCLint with annotations for buffer readable and writable extents. Fairly complex annotations are necessary even for simple buffer/size relationships, and no inference mechanism is available. Splint has an unsound constraint-based checker which uses heuristics to analyze common loop forms. The effectiveness of this strategy is unclear, though in [7] the false positive rate was 75% after annotation.
MECA [17] is an annotation-based checker built on MC [1] . An initial set of annotations provided by the programmer is propagated bottom-up through the call graph, after which statistical inference is used to select likely additional annotations for confirmation by the programmer. Our inference is more aggressive, propagating information top-down without being checked. MC can be used to find operations leading to overflows, such as unchecked array accesses [1] , but not comprehensively check for them.
Houdini [8] infers annotations by using predefined heuristics to guess potential annotations, including buffer/size relationships, and eliminating ones refuted by ESC/Java. Houdini achieves high accuracy and coverage, but due to the number of guesses required and expense in refuting them, seems to scale poorly.
Daikon [6] infers annotations by running an instrumented program through a test suite and collecting invariants. Such a dynamic approach may generate invariants that hold over the test cases but not over all inputs. As with Houdini, Daikon can be used in conjunction with ESC/Java [10] to remove incorrect invariants.
Static buffer overflow checkers which do not rely on annotations can be deployed on code bases with little risk. These include ARCHER [16] , BOON [15] , and the PolySpace C Verifier [11] . While offering great utility for finding overflows, the requirement for very precise interprocedural analysis limits the effectiveness of these checkers. Zitser et. al. test these and other checkers on Sendmail, a 145,000 line program, and 14 model programs [18] . ARCHER and BOON can analyze programs the size of Sendmail, but find only 1 and 2 of the model program overflows, respectively. In contrast, the PolySpace C Verifier finds almost all of the model program overflows, but cannot analyze Sendmail. Our checker achieves coverage similar to that of the PolySpace C Verifier (Section 6.3) while analyzing programs of any size, at the expense of requiring annotations.
Dynamic overflow mitigation techniques include checking stack integrity to detect overflows after they occur [4] , or checking memory accesses to prevent overflows from occurring [3, 14, 13] . Overhead generally increases with the amount of protection provided. Static and dynamic techniques are complementary, with static checkers finding many overflows before runtime, and dynamic checkers finding those that get through.
CONCLUSION
Deployment of an annotation-based checker is a daunting prospect, requiring a potentially huge amount of effort for a potentially negligible payoff. Enabling incremental deployment through the technology in our system has allowed us to clear this hurdle, to demonstrate effectiveness, and to build momentum towards comprehensive annotation and checking at a scale far beyond what could have initially seemed possible.
